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A.
The Comnittee on External Economic Relations hereby euhdt*},to
the European Parllament the following Uotion for a Resolution, together
with explanatory statement:
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on trade relations between the EEC and .fatrnn
The European ParlLament,
- 
concerned by the persistent and increasing deficit in the Community'e
balance of trade wlth JaPan,
- aware that thls deficit, although comparatively small ln the context
of the Communlty's overall trade flgrures implies a severe threat
to the Conununlty in certain specific sectors, PartlcuLarly in I
manufacturing industry, 'i
- 
convinc€d that a reductlon of the present trade irnlcalance iilrutra
contribute towards a better overall understanding between the
Conmunityand.Tapanwhichwouldgofurtherthanpuralycorutercial
considerations and in turn lead to cloEer cooperation in fields euch
as development aid, security, monetary stability, energy conservation'
and the suPPIY of raw materials,
- 
recognislng that it is in ilapan's interest to work towarde greater
understandLng with the conmunity in view of her vulnerabllity both
in terms of nationa]- security and energy supplles,
- 
recognising that the problem is one whlch can primarily be satlsfac-
torily resolved by increaelng the competitiveness of European products
vis-i-vis the Japanese in all markete and stressi-ng therefore the
need for greater effort by European industsy in tuts reapect'
: - -."X"* r.agio; trre r i st< that -protecEl onfgt GaffiFc i-iA, i fr-fatien E,
lndividual lrtember States, wtth re'sulEdit Eerlous 'congeguGncea
not only for EEC/Japan comnerclal relations but also tor *ifid'-
Cmrnity and world trade, and convinced that thls can be
averted by a greater degree of understanding by iIaPan of the
probleme that the Present trade deficit Poseg both economically and
politieally for the comnunltY,
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- 
welcomes the fact that the Council of Mlnistere at their rneeting of.
17 February 198J. have taken poeltive steps to create a Comunity
strategy towarde itapan,
- recognlaing that the effective ieeofutton of tft. pr"lfems created
by the deficit in the balance of trade between the CormunLty and
,rapan can best be achleved by the formulation by the Comnission of
a vigorous common Corununity trade pollcy towards ilapan, including 
-
a) cloeer cooperatlon and:ffiuovd-,ffii@ai,,*fuauetry
b) worklng together to eLiminate both tariff and non-tar16f
barr iers,
c). encouragementr"of efforto,by Hrbo1roan expdLtes to ssciii€'a
gleater share of the 
'Iapanese rnarket,
d) recitrrrocity in banklng and inveetment facilities,
e) quantiflable self-restralnt in exports by ilalnn ln specific
sectors, and a sub8tantLal increase in lts inporte fron the
Comnrnity, ,
- 
realising that unless there iE an effective regolution to Liie deficit in
trade, then pressures upon i,ledber State Governnentg could force the Councll
of Minleters to take stringent action against ifapan,
- having regard to the l{otion for a Reeolut!.on tabled by Slr Fred TV}iRNER
and othere (Doc. L-965/AOI,
- having regard to tle report of the Conmittee on External Economic Relations
(Doc. 1-24O/eLl,
1. R€quests the councll anatcli'd comiitdE;Fi.Fq trrs.ElrryBewreqw*tiee to:-erEIE€ --
that aII negotlations with ilapan will be conducted fkmly and constructiv€Iy
and be based not only on an undergtandlng of the needa of the Cornnunity but
algo of those of Japan and the UgA'who together form the world's three most
sigrnificant trading grouPs and on whoEe effective cooperation any lasting
global trade a,tEatrgenente'nust''d.enan41
2. Ca1ls on the council and cosurriseLon-to ensure that any agaeement concluded
will provide for reciprocal measures on the part of 'Iapan in respect of E!1y
concessLonE whictr may be granted by the cotruouBity to JaPani
3. Urgee the Conunission
(a) to continue itE effofts to ensure the harmonlzation of trade policy
measur€s taken by individual lllember Statos and algo to ensute that thd
Conmunity will speak "with one voice" through the Coumis6ion in itg
deal-ingrs- with' iDaPan't',
(b) to ensure, with respect to-the'Community's competitlon policy, that
the relevant clauees of the Treaties (Artic1es E5'to 94) sre not apPll€d
with the result that industry within the Comnunlty ie penaliged to the
advantage of lnduatry'from t6#a-o6untriai,- taotuding-56enr - -
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c) -' quantftffi
respect of the export of sensitive, or potentially
sensitive, products to' the Conurunity. this wlll have to be
a continuouE process which w111 require close cooperation,
at community IeveI, not only between Commigaion and Mernber
States but also bettreen the Commisslon and retrxesentatlves
of, European lndustry;
d) to make crear to Japan t-nat an .rrure to .uao. rytwgz.ffi'
rnrst lead to countel-measulee on behalf of the Contmrnltyi
e) to be prepared, where it can be established that non-tarlff
bartierE to trade exist, to 6nt'roduce, at Conunrnity level,
reciprocal meaEures withln the framework of the GA[[l
reconmends in thi.s context that the CormlgeLon Etrotrld be endor.ued
wLth adequate funds to instLtute a Eervice to investLgate
allegations of concealed protectlonleml recognj.ELng that industry
itself may find difficulty ln dealing with such protectLonism;
1o ue prepared t;-."."Pt trre n-eea --.
existlng regulationq and dlrectives regarding''type approval'
of manufactured artlcles, particularly motor vehicle parts,
mandatory rather than Permiseive;
h) io take Eteps to erisfie-{fraE-anf agreement wlth ilapan wlll
lncludeprovlslons'ensuring':Iu1f,-fAcipr-6-dtfiifrffi6ffiF*oa-baiinvest-
ment facilitiee bets€en ttrc,ttro parincrsr anf]arlffiFiffi-ri?g, - ''-
\rheth€r, od=6-,frio1[-otr1ffi ot-joEnf sT @{1*9;toafrnC@et hite ---
wrLtt€n agir€emente to enEtrt " ttraffiffi'SIdffiGilf
oients . or iraterLal g uc€d .h' |rocttct1liln rizrf aiiltt6E\' iooili.S- ana-€EiE
reeearch and devetrop€nt t€$dlteen ire fn{i'oaucid a'a-a'rasurt Ln-
order to promore enp'Ioyaar6,-'pige{uleEt-tesi'daai cin4iffiS8ir^S$Snsion
tn the area or region doneinea''-: -- 
'--'"'i - -*1
i1 'EoT6F-up a joint EEC/JaPan Investment Bureau to facilltate
and to encourage approprlate inveetment fron either eide.
Ttre r61e of such an Invegtment Bureau should includq that
of coordLnating and exLendlng jolnt undertakings between
Japanese and coriuunity countrleE in third countries;
to
1n
f)
s)
PE 68. ElL/f,tr,t.r
4. Urges the representatives of European industry, wherever approprLate
in consultatlon with the Comnisslon, to cooperate closely ln such
fieldls as marketing and ReEearch and Development and rationalLzatlon
in order to fLnd not onty the best means of penetratlng the Japanese
rnarket but also of achLeving vlable competltlveness with reepect
to both Corumrnity and third country markets;
5. Aslcs the JaPanese for their Part -
a) to take concrete steps to eliminate non-tarlff barrLers to trade,
whether intentional or otho:vd-se;
to facilitate- iirvestmeni-and -Uan:<ing f"cif itGJ
eountries i - 
"-
for Community
to accept the necessity for full cooperation with the
cornmunlty in working towBrds monetary stabllization by
worklng towarde monetary cooperation between those l-nduEtrialieed
countrLes with convertible currencles, including the European
Monetary Syetem as a bloc, and the yent -'-;-'- :111 '?'J":1 :. - --'\:----
to cooperate \,rith the Member States of the Conununity in working
towards the reinvestment of the proftts of the oil producing
countdesi
to cooperate full-y with the conmtrnity in accepting specific
quantifiable restraints in respect of certain particularly
sensitive sectors while at the same time demonetrating its
willingness to accept a reaEonable Level of importe of manu-
factured goode from tlre Comrrunity;
f) to cooperate with the Cornrntrnity tn order to coordinate attL-
tudes towarde the o€fi6t* EEC tra{ing pdrtnerdi
considers that the links between the hrliarnent and the .IaPanese
Diet should be strengthened and the present exchanges Lntensified
not only in the llght of the good understanding and results so
far achieved but also in Order to bring about a greater politicaL
awareness of the problems which the present trade deficit tr,ose,
b)
c)
.l)
e)
6.
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7. Instructs its President to forward this reeolution to the
Commission and the Council and, for informatlon, to the Government
of Japan.
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B.
D(PTAINTORY ETATEDIENT
r. PR,ERACE
l' B€fore analyslDg the EEc and irqran€se LndustrLar and tradlng sltua_tl'ons, an attempt should be made to doflne the probrems of our twoComnunltiee. We see tham as follqre:
Japan
a) leggg:seg
arapan hae alnost no naturar resourees of her qrn. she is dependentfot g5% of her anergir requireuent' 0* rmports. The oil prr.ce rrsee haveaffecred her ro a greater exr'nt tnan etrtrer westerr-;;r;-]"'an" 
,ro.JaPan's econoELe groth and develolrnant aretherefore totalry depend€nt onlrporte' she Le the largest lnportet Ln the world of non-nanufaetur@dgoode and has to pay for Ehese lnporEs by exporte. ManufrcturLng Le theonly means of obtslninE tbeae exporte si.nee there 18 littls blse ro EEu.
b) ggygrlr
Although alapanese lnduetry nay f,lourLeh, some eections of her co6mu_nLty are etlu poor. Eouar.ngr standards strll tend to be lqr and mostroods are lnadeguhte. staadards of llving have therefore roqr forinprovernent.
c) Vulnerabilltv
___-____-_-_G
'rapan feels vulnerabre both ln terms of national seeurity and offoreign r.nfluenee ovEr whtch she has no control. on the defenee side,as the only eountry whieh has been subJected to a nucl.ar attack r.n war,irapan has vowed she wIll never produee nor ourn nucrear arttra. she iseons@quent''y rurlrtar'ly dependent on the united states. rn terms of o11ehe has no way of eecaprng from the gri.p of the opEC countrr.eE and eeesth€ comunr.et threat to the Gulf states as affeeting her very survlval.
Nevertheless, Japan has rtanaged Eo naintar.n econonic irorth withqrta correaponding increese ln ol,l. eoneumptlgn. perhaps there Le a 1essonhere foi the ueet.
The.ComunLtv
a) gr9g9
2' The cbmu*,ty hae been ebnecr,oue of a growing trade Imbalance withJrpan for ruany y€ara ,.owo but has prwed incapable of reducrng r.t. voruntary
-10- PE G8.474 /fLn.
agreenents, suDoLt tBeetl,ng8, mN nogotLat,ions, have all faired to makG
any lnpact on the f,lgurea. The deflclt hag in fact increaeed fron
1086n EUA tn 1973 to 514?m EUA ln 19?9 
'dhen the irnport/export cover ratto
uae only 47.1*.
b) Induatrv
--------
rhe iraPBnese have coneEntrated theLr exports ln etrncifLc Bectors,
notabty in nanufacturlng lnduetry. Today 64% of her total exports to th.
conmunlly ls ostlme ted eo bc in maclrirrory anrt lrarrelxrrt ogrripmont, ;r.d
2W ln other nanufactured goods. Motor vohLeles, consunor electroniee
and esroeras are three 66etors in whlch rlapancee exgrcrts ar€. paatLcularly
concentrated. fn consequenco, nany C@Bunlty lndustries ln thEee fLelde
are witnoeelng a threat to thelr very exl,atenc6.
c) $e-!:pge9E9_!31!9!
Desplte liberallaatLon of trade restrl,cllone by ilapan, a lwer tariff
rate Lnto Japan than Lnto the corumunity under cnrr and a professed wtlllng-
nesa to weleome foreLgn inveatnent, JEpan remaLns for nost comtrunlty
lnduetrlalisEe and traders Bn Ltopenotrable market. Further Japanesg
EeaaurGs to proteet Eh@ congumor and lhe envLronnent are seen as replaclng
trade Ilbo:allzatLon by the iqroeltton of new non-tariff barrLere.
conBequently, there exlits today a el.tuatr.on whr.eh, delnndlng upon
whether you are ilaprnes€ or EuropeBn, you.lrurvey the ecene ln hro dlstlnatllghte. The baslc cause ie, hmever, the samo, that is the need for
survlval in a world neaaced by
slng threat to p€ac€.
II. lgE SIIInTTON IN JAP,AN
Polltlcel
' receseion and with an inerea-
3. iralrn is srory movl.ng tmards a ,oore indetrrndent forelgn porlcy.
Presgureg oriet Ln ilapan udrlch are foreing Governnent to take a more
actlvo r01e ln internatlonal hffaire. hny far-thlnking irapanese see
the absolute neceeelty of, a close lnrtnerehip between the unlted states,the Eurotrnan comunlty and iIatnn and reedgnise that all three socleties
have an lnterEst in ualntgtntng eloEe pollglcal cooperatl.qr and rlbsrall.sedlnter:natloral trade. rt le recognLeed Ehat we have srlnilar baslc atns ln
wantlng to Presorv€ our democratLc systen to avoid war and eoDtrlbute to
a moro eqtltabre balanee bctrnen the tnduatrial and the deveroplng worrd.
PE 68.424 /fln.
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Politiear and eocial understanding @nnot, hereiveg, ,be brought atolt , '
gatLefactorlly between Japan end the Coiununity 
,if, trading and ecoflomLe
relut,Lona are unsEtietaetory., Largely becauee of. this. therE ls b6tub6n
the European cdnmunl,ty and tl" ilni.ted stgtes, on the ore hand, and Japah
on the other, a laclt of proper conprehenel.otr and courunlcatlon of,.6gch
oEhor'a LnteresLs, objectlvea and aeplrat{one. ith"rr ts a iact of rrrtual
understandlng of what 6aetr oountry expeete.frm, eh6 other siret the long
rua and shat ls inportant to lndlviduble Ln each countay. .?o f,l,nd a'
solutLon, improued trhdlng relaticns i{:ugt cone about and welnuropeane
muet, mrhd a greateu effort to underEtqnd the:eulture, t"irt" and
thinklng patterns of the JapFnese. I
satisfactory tradlng errangenente ehodld, ue, the firet btep teardc.:
lnproved relati,ons betxrcdn the imunlty and oa$9n in srrch i"."" as eircrEy
and ,raw materiare pollcyl devillolment. poltcy arril d.f,Errae Lgsues
cu!.tureaaUEggluEglgrl!&E l. i
"l4. The hablt dmongst ,fapeneEe of extrerne def,efeqce of behdvlbur and
formsllty emongot thoge who are not thaLr closeifrl.ends aae]asgelstas
makes it very dtfflcult for both itapanese and flretgmore to uirderstand
one another. xn dealLng wlth the ilapanege {t {i tnnportant, to tcrl;;-
both the nature and ltultatlore of the courteay"exSireesed. ,?g,gal,n the
respoet of the ilapaneso a fcelgnir ls Errp€ated,to roturn yirltenese. To
be guiet and putisnt, but ar the lrrne ,tln@ to be, dtrong ln attitude and
eharActer. The JaPanebe l.n thelr reaetlon to ori€ Lnother t{trgeen gr6(Ip
acknarledge eubrtisaf,on to th€ atrongar ana aaJsbtment to.th€ weaker. It.
Ie of the uttnost lfiportance tb reeogmlse t,he iOle of, dourtesyl-
i.on and strengtti. . 
,
,+:-1. gggg!9gr
Europ€ans with hlqh etandards of, gourEesy iho\rld bo abl.b to uridrrsEtnd
the tradltLons of eurture and polltendss whLch aCe, so nuch ar pFrE otr. l
sueeesefufly dedling wlth the .Ialenese. 
. I ! ,'.
.
Li. Patience ) :
Egually, a prqPorsity tn Europe for takLag rqobe trr* ui d"riclouit I'
maklng ae eomlrared to orr tuirlaan frlends, can,.Fbl'usaa'to aaw4cU$t'. ..
The ilapanose ar€ not Eceustmed to qulsk declslori nahinE 
"nal .gr,#;;tBnd buoiness dea'ls can rardly be forced,thrguEh qglElcly.,
- t2 -'
.t
!
l
rrr. !9gg$g!9999
If trntlence ls a virtue, peraiatence le 
€ven nore so in relaEione
rlth the ilaPanose. lfhether lt be perelstence in eoring to speclfic tred6
agreenents or persLetetrce for entry Lnto e narket 
- thls ie a vl.tal
elemcnt for guccess. 'Ehe ilap,anese thenselvee have shmrr thle quallty tn
galning entry to th€'Aner{can, European andl no, the chinese narkets.
lv. AesLmilatLon
;;. ;"*""". ,. ro greBt lengrhs ro undersrand and assr.nflare rho
langruagee, tradlng uethods, sconmLc factorer strengths and weakneaaes
of colrtttors, ln product speclfloatLors, narketing methods etc. tfhether
ln doing buslnees ln uapan or Ln negotl.atlng wlth tirem coneerning lbnet-
ratr.on of thcir products lnto the Cormunl.ty, a close aectoral knorledge
la neceesary both of our'q,n Lndustry and that of the Japanese.
9. Strenqth
--------
As a Cm!flrnJ'ty re have to recogniee that in negotiatlng with the
ilapaneso, we shall'onry garrt what we regul.re whether in comtni to agree-
mente oa voltmtary aedtrLctlons of entry of goodo lnto tha coruuntty or
eaeing entry of our C,n products into irapan, lf we can negotlate from
a postt!.on df atrength. strength neede to be derlved frou unLty of
approch whether ln the caee of the Cormunity or ln Lnduetry and fiom a
knoledge of where the Japanese themeelves are vulnerable. One has to
recogmise that to a maJor extent, statenents made in general terme conceE-
nl'ng export restral'nt, lmport llberallzatLon,€tc, are uselees unless they
are aeccnpanied by epecific undertaklngs on the part of the Japaneee whl.eh
can be meaeured both in guantity and ln tine and which lf not complied.ryith
wlrr be repald by salutary measures. we shall return to thie, but lt ig
I'mportant at the outset'that the necEse!.ty for negotiatlqr fron etrength
J.s rccognlsed ss belrgr of paramount importance.
rII. INEDE BEIIilEEN TE EEC ATqD JAPAN
5. The arapanege share in Fotal worrd trade, excludlng intra-EgC trade,
is no around 9%. Thi'e coq$res wLth 16% fot the us and 23% for the EEc.
rn 1979 ccmnunl.ty Lnportc fror irapan.e€re crly 4.5% of totar extrE_
cornunLty lotrrcrte, yet orporta,to ilapan wore a meagre 2.4% of, the cqmuntty,s
total export,s to third countrLes.
-13- PE 5a.474 /fln.
'e
J6!ra$'s gro6s dqtestlc product in 1929 rdas 732.9.bn tuA wlth sn
annual grereH 88t€ of over 6#. Thie iE abour the ilse of the cffiine€
GDP of the uK and Gernany. .rapon,s 
€xpotrts ate an estfunaGod 10% 6f tt€h
GDP. rtrir lE uelr be lar'aho p"oporttorrs exportod by Franeei @rrueny end
the United Klngdou, whieh ate t7oA. 22% d,nd 23S raspectlvelgr but well
aborre th€ usA whooe vdgt domGstic mdrk€t keepg exports dern t6 g"/ of @Dp.
Tho fact that 90% of Japan'e GDP rsmairrs at home is sigmlfl.cEnt, uh6n
conslderiaE th€ c&0munlty's ef,f,orts to inlcroase i,tis expo,fts ,.nto thEt
c,ountry.
6. Bec$en 19?3 and '1979 the trade balence betwedn the Cdflrtufii.ty an6
and Japan deteriotated eoneLderably. ouring thiti portod the Conarunitly,e
defl,ci.t irretet,sed by 37o% f,rm lrog6m EIIA to 5,147m EUAr rrr 1973 tH6
cover rats ses 6ts, ifl lgzg it had reduced to onLy 47i1, td trggo th€
posi.tion contlnugd,,to worsen and by ttre end of AuguBt che confrunity
deficlt wlth ilrpi'n hed exeeeded thdr for the hhotc of 197g.
Thls ls wetl lltrustf,eted by rh€ f,ollffilng Btetigttrcss-
[&BI{E..I
quour tpq flT qm.p qq+reqP *- arlr opaurt orcs5
8oerGar gqDDf6ltrt tC tD. hutlg &ttclttl, &i.b &,tlatlnr lufftstrld
(t1 r-' fuC6.r! !! ftdlstfr 
'
lrr d.fin
lsrl $odr tcwcatca
alid l.a$5s{* ct o&ala [trrrtuil'tt dl{)rA.irrda tua- odrt tuuttstrr.lr, driri*r,
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?. Indleatlons are that the trade funbalanee beLveen the EEC and Japan
for 1980 as a whole wtll htve substsntlalry exceedad 6r000n EIIA. The
uatn reaeong fot thls adverie eltuation c&n be found in the irapanese
€conony ltself. In 1978 Ehere was I healthy expansLon of dmestle dernand
ln ilapan. ThLe waa ehcouraged by increased publie spendlng, enCourage-
loent of private spendlngl an 
€:rpanslonist nonetary polley and by imnrolait
terEg of loports resulting f,ron a sharp rLse in the yen. Biports increased
ln 1978 by 2o%o whllat Lnporte lncreased by r4.5%. GNp lnereased by
5.6% over the prevlous !lg!a agoinet an Lnfration rate of onry g.w.
trAELE II
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Sourc€r OECD SurveyB l9ZZ and l9B0
rn 1979 the situatLon changed radicalry. Although gnowth in cNP
contlnued eatr.afactorlry at 6% and Lnf,latLon rae under.control, there
ras a substantiEl f,all in the balanee of palments. Rapldly extrundLng
lndustrlal production and hme dernand boosted lnports and redueed
lncentLvea to extort. A aharp rLee in Ere prLee of imported ensrgy,
parttcularly oLI, atso ilrpd a slgmlfioant part.
8. Tho above table whLch reiere to calendar years doaE not eh6ql that
ln the flnanclal year ended 3l lrlarch l98O ilapanese trade shcred a reeord
deficit of 913.4 bllllon. rn thle perlod l.nports of crude oL!. alone
accounted for armost 940 bllllon, an increaee of 66.4% on the prevLoue
y6ar. ReeultLng frm thLe sltuatl.on there uas a sharp decrlne ln the
yen agaLnet the us dorrar. The f,arr of the yen and the attEndant rlekg
of l.nflatLon caused ths irapanese to revlse their monetery pollelee in
1979. Behreen Aprll of that year and !{areh 1990, the Bank Rate was
ralaed four tines to 9*.
w 6a.474 /trLrr.-15-
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,, l 9' eo a leBult Of the eecoad t*trol.un crLsis, the \rapan€B' GoeErtrasntlald den, ln Dece&€if 1979, nEw eeonqric gui.derlnes whlch lnr!.ude6 uteqrort drlve aad a el0ner r.ncr.ase r^ r"*i.". Ehr.s rssul"tod trtr e#Irortr' lnereaelng by 23.2% ln volurns corqrarJ-ng February r98o to tbb8utry lg?0.
' rhl,s haa, of cguroe, bEen faeilttited by the constderable delrec1"gtoh' of ths yen whleh reotored Eo rlapaneise exporters ths prJ.ce coqnttt{v6*
as88 thoy r.ost at the end of 1g?gr ratgety d,n coleequeace oE Ghlllacreaee tn exportsl .rapan'a naDufaeturlng output roBa thaoughc*rt-lsgh.
partleuiarry notebre sbs Ehe rncreasc r.n produatr.@ aruil e*gnrtof carar-lorrles and motorcycleb. -
or th€ hotE front, despr.te rarge whoresare prr.ee rno"ae""g,retair galee rose vdgorouoly J.n early lgg0, but the J'p.rres. 
..rr.rilEohtrerct.d to the nholesare pr,f.ee exprosion by inpoelng credit rcstric_.tl0ne and ra,'sr.ng th6 bank rate agai,n. Econontc gru,th rn Jalrn MawEE a result gven noto 6xport depondent.
:10. rt rc very elear thrt the measuros whr.ch the arapanase have ttkato proteet theli ooonolhy fron the effects of, cqunodrty f,acsergeo navcbeea gucceaefirl; Thera Ls every sl.gn that fgg. wfU ;;T;;*to a helthy surplue wlth the lndustrtatr.sed countrr.6s srth wbuirrprn r'8 tladrnE. rhtq wr'x.r. be due to substsnttalry lnereaoed QonroEt.-wrtli a ddciE'E'Eo or: suatuu (tgo-'fn- x.&grrrs:' Eowerrer,-ffitE-rr.t.orit:
cGso aboUt only one year aftcr irapen agrced, under pr€gsut:o lron tilc,'Enltea states and the EEC, to lrnlt the arnount of it' Q*tosts.
11. trt r.sr thes€f,ofej-'evident that the Eurotrrean corununr,ty must a60pta strong, creer and eoordtnated polrcy tn reEard to irapan so 18 toensurE that ilapan doea not rn the fliture assert ita aEcendancy overnuch of our induetry. To e1r.G, thls sr.tuatron to eo,ntinue ae Lt ffi 
,enlcte rs to a110 the alepaneeo to use c@unity uarkets to protcct l.he oa Gcon@y and her'oun tndustry. contrnur.ng rneffectrro coJiao_Esaaur€a can only Lead to inrreased uneinprolment ln th6 cqtl,ntty udthe dectuatLon of neny ,of, Lte ,Lmportant lndustrLes.
12' Euroetat etatr'etrss, whieh conelderatr,ons of space Ghe itt4naatbte tb roproduee hero, denongtratc 
.ithat for Gt€rmBny tho transport and rnachlnery a€ctor represenEed byfar the hlgheet p€tcsnt8g6 of ite total exports to ilapan, nuch hLgtcrthan th€ proportion of other &renber states, exportel but stlrl lte
€aports ln this aector only amounted ta 3l.S% of ite Lnporte. Italy,m thG othcr hand, takee 45% of its totar lnports fr.,. J.pan trlr th*s
It
I
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sector compared to 60% for Ge::many, 63% for France and 70% for Britain.
rtaly also has a much lorer deficlt in lts trade with Japan. considering
the hlgh preponderance of vehicle lmport,a into the cornnunity, except iftto
rtaly whieh Lmposes restrictions on imports of cars from outslde the comunlty,lt rold seen that ehb reeeLves conslderabre advantages frm tlrese reetrlctlons. Ttrepoaltion of the unLted Klngdom ts particurarly serious. she has a rarger
share of the comnunity's deficit with.rapan than any other country. rn.,
Paaticular her exports in the transport and machinery sector are only 13.2%
of her imports. Thls may be due to sme extent to the op€nnes. of the
IIK narket compared to that of eqne other rrtember state'.
slBUeruRE OF TRApE
13. The bulk of the cqflmunlty,s r.mporte from Japan has a*ays eonsr.stedof manufaetured produetsl and eince rg73 has aecounted for over go% ofthe total' Durlng thls period there hae been a marked lncrease in thecategory of machlnery and transport eguipment up from 46.4%of totalCommunlty imports ln 1973 to 64.7% Ln LgZg. This is 1argely due toLrrcreaeed exports of cars and motorcyeles whlch now constitute a majorprobrem rn EEc/,lapan rerations (see section of this report Eelating tomotor vehiclee, paragrraph 5g et seq. ).
Durlng the past six yeare there has also been a further shift tqrardshigh varue, hrghly automated manufaetured products at the expense ofproduete of more labour intenslve industries. Japan is at present systemati-carly rncreaerng its speeiallzation in manufaeturea goocrs with priorr.tybeing glven to eleetronics, data proeeseing and .lut.onatLon (robots). Theseare seetors in rhich \rapan has arready estabrished a considerable readon the EEC. 
,^-_.--rr-- , 
fn contrast to ,Japanese exports,thoee f,rm the conrnunlty have not greatry ehanged in content since 1973(Tabre r) 
' rn 1979 maehlnery and transport eguipment aceounted for 27.6%of comnunlty exports as against 2g-4% 
'n 
1g73. AIso most rerevant ls thefact that tn rgTg community exports of maehlnery and transport eguip,nentto .fapan were eguLval,ent to only 20% ot JapAnese exports of the same goodsto the cqununity- This eubstantial gap in the seetor of hlgh varue addedproduets ie syuptoratlc of the difference in eompetitivenese between theEEc and irapan in high technorogy produets. -----vs"s€s s Ew Ene ,r
-L7_ pE 68.474 /ftn.
Country
Germany
France
UK
rtaly
Others
Tota 1:
T+BLE III
.fapan's trade wlth main Community countriesin 1979 in percentage:
% of Trade
32.8
15. t
23.4
8.4
20.3
I00.0
-18-
% qf Deflcit
27.3
16.0
?9.1
1.5
25.9
100.0
l{hat has to be done
L4. There is clearly a growing awaren€se ln the rnstltut,iong of the Comunity,
in national governments of the Cornmunity and not least in Capan lteelf, that
the groring defLcit with the EEC muet be tackled.
on the poeitlve sLde we ean point out that, irapan's customs tar{ff
reduetionq under GATI have been the higheet of all partleipant 'eountriea,Ii.e., 50%is agai.nst 30% in the ease of the United State8 and25% for the
Corununity. The Japanese average tariff rate is 37" and 5.5% for produoto
originatlng in the EEC.
Nonethelese, posltlve sEeps muat be taken by the comnunity and
bueLnessmen to reetify the currenq unsatiefaetory trading eituatlon. This
report endeavours to nake eome lrcsitive reemmendations aE to hol businesa
relatlons ean be better establiehed by Community flrms with .Iapan and as
Eo how the Japanese themselvea can make the way oaeier. The situaEion both
with regard to trade with and investment by itapaneee eorppnieo in the
European Communlty Ls then examined.
IV. DOING BUSINESS IlT .'APAN
15. The ilapaneee citizen is inherently nationaliatlc and, with Eme e:neetrF
tions, wilL aluost always prefer to buy a ilapanese rather than a foreiqln
product. By doing eo he sees hlmeeLf ae eupporting his country. rn
additionr he tende to be coneeious of detall and appree!.ative of guality.
A menufaetured product wllr se1l much more easily if it hae one or
a number of the follelng characterietiee:
I
- De jure, de f,acto reductions are e8timated by uNrcE ae being 25?
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c.
It ie not yet ln producElon in Japan,
It possesses features or advanced technological specifications
not ineorporatad Ln ,Iapanese eguivalent products;
ft can be regarded as a status symbol.
Manufacturere wishing to sell in Japan must be able to ensure consiE-
tent quality, good delivery and a Eirst class back-up service. Exporters
have to be prepared to send their executives on repeated visits to .7apan
with the expectatlor of prolonged stays and some eventual residence in
Japan. Often visite of the Chief Execut,j.ve himself are necessary to
establlsh busLness.
15. Foreign businesgmen mugt make assiduoue efforts to understand not
only thelr eustomers and Ehelr markets, but also the goverrun€nt machinery
app€rtainlng to their buslneee. There are thirteen principal !{inistrLes
and nine State Agenoies in ilapan. These tend to be independent and will
often hold different viewe about industry, trade and finance in regard to
both domestic and foreign lnterests. It is important therefore that
businessmen find out t hich Governmbnt Departments are important to tlreir
obtaining access to the Japanese markete. They should then make direct
contact aad try to deal wlth the seetions and individuals wit,hin these
departtmnts who ar6 most dLreet,ly concerned. Acgualntance with the right
GoverrulAnt offLcials on a p€rsonal basls is important if the effort
neceEsary to solve probleme is to bear fruit. Information and help are
mueh more likely to cqrre from officials in the right Mlnistry rrho have been
'cultivated' than dl-rect reguests wlthout a building of prior relationships.
In addition to patience and persistence, already mentioned, the building
of personal relationships, howerrer formal these may be, is vital to succeas.
L7. One must also remember that bhe Japanese normally fietd high quality
negotiating teams who are eontrreterit and extensively briefed. They reguire
ansrders to numerous guestions and ask these again and again on each subse-
quent visit. Everything is recorded; no meetings are held on a one-to-one
basie. ilapanese decision makJ-ng is reached by consensus, eoneeguently
many people may be involved in the negotiating process. This gives the
Japanege the advantage of having mqre time to evaluate the foreigner and
double eheck his facts and figures. It resulte in far more drawn out
negotiations than are uged in the Yilest, but flts ln well with the neeessity
for group decision taking and freguently for backstage consultations
between ilapanese busineEs and admlnist,ration officials.
It is, however, a fundamental fact that a business will sueced ln ,rapan
onJ.y if it plays the game according to Japanese rules and with an unders-
tanding of the system.
a.
b.
- 
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,a .'
fhe Dietrlbution Svatem
lg. one of the most dlf,flcult aspeete of, the ,rapanese market ie ite
distrlbut{gn system. By Wegtern standardg it ls moet inef,fLcient. The
JapaneEe consum€r hae to pay a very high price for belng supplied vLa a
serles of layers of wholeealers which servl,ce thousands of eroalI 6hotr>
kee;rers throughout the country (there aro some department etores ln oatrnn
but almost no suPernarkets and retail chaine ao we kncn* theru). fhrEher,
the blgger wholesalers and department Etores are usually'controlled by
Japanese manufaeturers or banks who effectively hlnder the sale of foreign
goodd. It ls, therefore, neeoosary to find a my round the problo6 t{her€ver
possl.ble, glven the extreme dlfficulty of gettlng to gripg with the ,itrapqBeee
dlatribution eyeten. As an example, r European electricar apprLance
nanufacturer succeeded ln eelling eoffee makerE through ooffee shopo and
electrl.e Ehavers through barber ehops, whLlst almoet totatry faillng in
the riornal digtrlbutiql chain.
A further polnt is that whilst lt iE nost lmportant to earry out a
eonstant and detailed market researeh, in praetiee it is dlfficult to do
so beeause of the dlstrlbuEion syeten.
19. H@Ever, whattrr re Ilke Lt or not, thLa distribution system exi.ets
and exporter8 to iraPan raust live with lt. llhe rnail.n hope is thdt there are
signs that the syetem le beglnnlng to ehange under pr€sour6 fr@ ilgpanpga
consumerg themeelves.
There i.s therefore nuch which bueinessmen from tt e Community ean
thenselvee do l-n establishing the:i,r businesses in Japan. Having sal.d ttpis,
hmever, lt is up to the Jr'rpanese to ensure Lhat they provide filrther
assiqLance to foreigmers and, ln particular, go further than they have
untll nor Ln dlsmantLing the eonsLderabtre barriers to trade rrhich exi-st.
rtle nl*t eeetLon of, thts r€port, examines what these bar.r-j.er.s ar€.
Earri€rio to trade
20. r'rcm the nid l95os to the early 1970s, irapan adopted a vi.grorousl-y
protectr-onist attLtude to trade. lmports, particularly of manufactured
goodg, were either dl.s€ouraged by dLscriminatory tax barriers or by effec-
tlv€ Fon-tariff barriers. companies were regul-red to buy from LoeaL suppl.lsps
and publlc procuremerlt, PoLicies, partLcularly in sensitive seqtors guch ae
tel.acommunicatLons and railway eguipment, only a&oitted rocar oupprlers.
Tday many of the technical barriers have been removed and tariffs
have been lowered signlficantly under GATT. sone effort,s have been nade to
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simplify inspection forraallties, e.9., in the automobile sector, and in
relation to pharmaceutical products and electrieal and gas appliances.
2L. Deepite this there can be littIe doubt that non-tariff barriers do
remain which effectively increase the difficulty in entering the market.
The main non-tariff barriers can be
a) Cuetoms
b) Product Testing
e) Ilealth and Safety Standardsd) Labelling
e) Admlnlstratlve Guidancef) Governnent Procurement Polieies
a) customs
found ln the follcruing areas:
Difficulties with Customs procedures are perhaps the most widely
experienced and moat resented of non-tariff barriers. Freguent eompJ-aints
are made that Customs officials tend to be rigid and arbitrary in applying
regulations. Customs preedures are complex and time consumLng. Explana-
tions for Cuetons decislons are often not made and no effective appeal
systern exlsts.
22. It is important that Community businessmen should be encouraged to
chroniele difflculEies met aE custqne points and to submit these to the
communlty offices in Tokyo for investiqation. The Japanese should cooperate
fully in invest.lgating complaiats made. A elear grriclc should also be
ptrbllshed Co help importers understand what Customs elearance reqrriremcnts
are. It should be drawn up with the direct involvement and consensue of
the custons authoritles themseLves. The Japanese Government should be
asked co Lnstitute aome form of trainlng for CuEtoms officials ro help
them to adopt a less traditional time consuming and restrietive approach
in thelr dealings with i-mporters and the appllaation of Customs rules.
b) Product Eee!1lg
23. Standards of guality and safety can reasonably expect to be set by
any nation anxloue to make eertain that goods eominq on to lts markets do
trol <'augo harm. As far flg l)osstlrlo, hrx"rover, lrrlcrnat iorr.rl l;l.an<lnr.dg ltcr.rl
tcl be adopted to facilitate worrd trade. The Japanese seem to pursue a
policy in the testlng and eertLficatlon of produets which is deslgned to
tlelay, confuse and dLscourage importers. Testing proeedures tend to be
eomplex and Lmplernented in such a way as to place the import-ing manufae-
turer at a distlnct digadvantage compared to loeal Japanese producers.
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whilst ful1y reeognlsing that the Japanese have a ri-grrt to insist on consls-tent and good quarity products, it is entirely wrong to broek entry byderiberatery compricated testrng proceduree and diserimindtion in favourof local produets.
Once again, as wi.th Cuetois, produet eertification, standards andproeedures of testLng need to be slmplifled so as to assLst, not hlnderrthose foreign manufaeturers who are abre to meet the gualLty stEndards
regul'red. Japanese and foreign compahiss must be afforded simllar treat-
ment ln the type, nethod and l0cation.of testlng. one further polnt isthat product testlng ehould not regulre manufaeturers to diserose lnfor-
mation on methods of ttadufaetrlre and ecdnposition crf produets wlthout
complete justification.
c) gesM_!sg_gessgs_gtesggsg!
24' once again, the Japene8e are fully entitled to ensure that stdnaldtdg
comply with the reasonabLe expectatl.ons of society. rf JapaneEe ears Ere
made to emissr-on standards whlch reduce pollution, then foreign rmporter.
need elso to conply' However, it le altogether ehother matte,r for health
and safety standards and proeedures to be designed to miliEate againstforelgn producers rrlthout there being any discernible danger to the heaLthor safety of JallEneae consum€rs. Further, the Japanese authorlties must
recognise thet thelr system of advLeory committ,ees in each Minlstry whiehare required to vet standarde, freguently and unneeessarily cause delays.There is a need for a clear and coneise bulletin to be issued to expralhthe eontent of and redsons for etandards shich are set. Gulderlnes Ehourdbe gLven to importers and auEhorrbies arike on the proeedures to befollovred for submitting and teetLng of produets.
The Japanese having stated thelr wlllingness to move tovrarde the
aceeptance of lntbrnatLonal standards muet be seen to b6 actlng aeeordirtgto their promises. The ccnrmrsslon,e ihvolvement is essentiar tci makeebrtain that this is takrng praee. rndeed, the commidsioh ehould mokegreatdf uge of lts qrn reguratory power to pregcrlbe striritar enforeedbre
standards for sueh products as motor vehr.eles and components whr.eh aresold on EC markets.
d) Labellino
25. Although an apparently
produets Eor the ilapanese is
in t-he case of foods, small
unimportant subject, the matter
a major irritant to importers.
items often have to be unpaeked
of labelling
For instance,
tndtvldually
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at t'he rJapanese Port' of entry where rabele have to be affixed on each iten
with the nanre of the importer and the date. Again there appear to be needless
regulations sueh as reguLrlng weights and measures to be shclrn only ln
metric, but not in both met,rie anrl UK j-mperial unit-s.
rrritants to exporters, to Japan such as these couId, in everyone,s
best, lnterests, be done away with.
e) 4dmlnistrative Guidance
26' As explained in the sectlon on lndustrial policy, the rerationship
between Ministriee and lndustry ls very elose. The Japanese covernment
deny pressure Le exerted on lnduetry to rfutrtt foreign importe. rt
certainry aeens, however, that lhe MinLstry of rnEernational Trade anc
rndustry (Mrrr) and other t'tlnlstries have in ttre past kept a close regu-latory eye on bueinees seetors reguirlng either protection or deveropment
and thLs has meant exerudlng importers, producte in the same sphere.
currently ln the field of high epeed integrated eircuits there is conslderable
invorvement of Government wlth industry to,f11n6 and produee the latestproducts of t.his technology. sLnce this is a sensitive area, imports are
extremely difficult to achLeve. Ilowever, direct covernmenL pressure Lo
stop imports is very much less than it ueed to be. This is priruarily
because lt is conELdered that lraPanese lndustry is sufficiently modernj.eed
and comPetiEive to be able to stand on Lts oyn feet agal.nst worldwide
eompetltion.
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f) @vernment procurement
27' Acceas to pubrlc corporations in ilspsn is stirl severelyllmited to forergn firme-- -r;; ,raponese i.rr.-aor,. little toimprove the eituation oner tt" y""rr. whirst one can understendthe .rrpsnese point of.view, i" ln. 
""""-oi-tieir putrrcprocurement, then reciprocitv must be observed-in'[r,. Io*munity
;Hri:":::r:::.i:lo' ai""s i'o-'r'p"""ee rirms -in communitv
rndeed the conmission should.make greater use of its ornresrularorv power to preEcr*e-simiii;-"#;;;;ibre standards for
il"1"T::;:::.r" motor vehiclee ana compo"""t" 
"nrch are sold
28' rn sumflery. the .Tepanese Government shourd recognisenon-tariff barriers as a tey forrcv i""r"'Jii-r"r." it wrdelyknown wirhin Japan that rhe rieu. of non-tariri-u""riers,and the openness of itg ,oertJt-to exporters, are eeriougand lmmedlate problens hrhtcfr-ieea. eolving by the Japanesethemeerves so as to eatabrleh better r.ritiirrs'J'rra a truerreclprocity wlth thc. communityl Thie rey need education arf;3il"r?X: i:'::::ratic r'vei' tn partllui"i-vi,r rspporteur
'' Il:.::rablishnrenr of infornratlon offices in Ministrieg and
2. An l_mprovement Ln the number end level of Governmentpubticationc on how to rmpoit rnto-.rap";: -"."3' The introduction of meesures to accelerate time rimitsfor customs appraleal ae"i"iorr".
4. The rrking ot.::":-I.te steps to help foreigners penetratethe distri.bution syetem.
'' 3::""if;::$Jf.3"..tl;Il"eins desree or roreisn testlns
6. The setting up of semlnars by gsc and Japanese authoritiestogether in order to herp u"iop""n bueinegsraen betterunderer.and Japrnese eultirre ana their ;;;i;.;; approach.
v.
29. One of the princlpal reasons for \rapan,s ability toexpand its overseas trade, hae u991 qr" ior,.r"t"ir supporr givento r.ndustrv bv covern'ent, ite ar-i!i;t.;-;;;,iil"tior," and Banks-The widely held :::l"i ttrat-"Jafrn rnc.,, is Jr,. tornog.n€ous entltyis greatly exaggerated,- yet unairr:cteary ttrIrJ'I*i"a" a much :il'il:'":"tll"r' and undei"t'nEiig uetwi"r,--JiJtIT'a rndustry thhn
'24 
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30" rt is essentiar to undersLanrr that the Japanesecivil service is amall, but its top echelons are staffed bythe eream of Japan's top llnivergities. rtr.se-orite bureaucratsnormalry Join the civil service when they reav. univerBity Enttremar'n there until they rre about 50 yeais old, sometimeeyounger. They will then enter politics, {uagilcovernmentcorporationa or private industry. Five oi tt" last sevenPrlme Ministers, about half the cabinet and numerous seniorexecutives in Japaneee lndustry have come from Goverrunent'departmente.
^ 
salary ecales in the civll service are much rower thanequivalent poaitione of seniority in rusine""..-' rgon.theless,the civll service stirl attracts the best braine in thecountry end they are re\rarded in terms or r."lonsibility andauthority.
31. ?he ClvL1 Senrj.ce is, hffeveEe trodeet in eize despiteite lnfluence- rndeed coverrunent ependlng amounts to 25%of GNp comPared to 44% in the unitea iiig,i..:'-1n r" are 4|covernm€nt enBloye€c among evGry fOO empioy.." oorp.red to10lr in Britaln.
of the Government departments supervising industrialpolicv, the l,rlnr.et"y ot-iililri"iio"ar-riaa"-"ia-rnao"try (Mrrr)is the most important. fhe Ministry of Flnance (MOF) is,however, the most powerful 
"r "ir covernment departments,holdlng, as ir doee,- the puree-"tri'g". :l;-*;;lontrot orstrongly infruence the coun.ry's Banke and FinancialInstitutione. This ie aone tLoygh the a""i-;i-.rapan,the centrar Bank, whrch rn turn-tJna" iorr.y"tJ-tire rzlargest conunercial Banke. rn-o"try r.n turn ie able tooperste wrth very hlgh-debt,/equity ratios u..rr"L in effectthe Government ti stinding ren'ina'trre -i an;1ffi- obrain.
32' corporate porrer in Japan ls concentrated in big busineae.The 700 top companiea bel0ng,to-an organisation called the"Keidanren,,. Here top marr"ier"rrt of ttre 
"o,.r,iryi, largestenterprlses meet.1ia11rrv io tair-ib;; ;;#iir, ,"",r"s whichconfront the bueiness cotnmunlty.,,Keidanrerr"-iJ organisedlnto various trade as"ociatlo"i'""a working eonunittees.
Relations between the staff of the ,,Keidanren,, andGovernment departments are very cJ.ose. problems 
"r"--..-dlgcuEEed in joint consurt.tiv! committeee on which sitEenior executivee of buein 
"" "na 
senior Government civilServants.
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During the paet twenty years, enormous efforts have beenmade by covernnent, Banks ind fnaust"y, 
"roiti"r-i. cloeecooperation with.each other, to keep i.rr"tr"i-strictly uncrerconrrol wtthour lnhlbtting groirth 
"l-,d to ;";i;"; signtficrntimprovernents ln productlvtty. rndeed .1"p"" t"i had conEiderabresucceos ln keeping the co6t of llving d;;l
rABLE rv
rnf,latlon
Consurner price fndex
EEC
usA
Japan
100
100
100
111
106
109
t22
rl3
116
L45
13s
L27
132
12t
123
soureer Euro'tat 
- BaSie statrstlce of the coimunity 1gg0:Tabte III
Although eeverely hit by the energy crisis in Lg73/74,J.pan has ampry succeeded in brlnging the situation undercontrol. At the same time produetivLty inprovement hesb€en-achieved by planned nodernlettion of llant andmachlnery and increaaed volume productlon.
INDUSTRY: Strateov
3!' over the paet thirty years the Japanege h6ve reco{inisildthe neceesLty of moving thelr rnaln e:rport indugtriessteadily from those utirising unskilleo lauour and intensive
manpower to those with predonrinantly skilled labour andaguin towardg more Eutomated and knowledge_inteneiveindugtrieE. rn the lg5o's industrles cuih as teJ<tlleethrl'ved, to be replaced ln the 1960,s by coneenttation onnotorcycles, radios, shipc and steel. ihen, during theL97O's, motor cars, colour televieion, high fiaeii[y
equipment etc., were in th6 tgccndrncy. ior, a iurtner shiftis taking place to conputers, data procedslng eguipnntsrrt, nicro-circuLte and high technorogy machlnEry. C""6""frent andlnduatry hsve r€dliaed thdi to remain-competltr"" rn fbretEnmarkets, they have had to plan for ongoin| cfrange in thbItnowledge thar unress they did, ttren othei couniri6s,ttrticulrtrv nerghboufihg countfiis of rhe de;;iili;g worta,wlth rower qrag6 rrtds, wourd aqurre rhe rdb;;r-Jiirrs rnatechnical know-hm to outBtrlp the Jepenese.
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35. Thie hae In fact come
vividly illustrated by the about ae predicted andfoLlowing table: Ls
Table v
Benelux e Germdny
Japrn
Far.EaBt
L972
I00
ioo
68
I6
'19?e
.IO0,
.95
85
13'
' . rgTg
. I00
85
74
I2. s
The increaeing wage rates in Japan have led to manyguite eophlaticated consurer product-s such as high riaeiityeguLpuent_being made by or ro-r Japanese com;ranLee off-ehorein those lower \rage rate ceuntt'ies of the Frr EasL.
36. A Government ineplred Et,rategy has, therefore, been
9:I:-1:ryd-to. facilttale tndustriai- cr,anse. ;;-;" example,measurea t,ook place_throgghout the I97Ois givlng ilepaneseinduetry the incentive to move to hlgher ,rif,r"-,Jaa"aknorledge indudtry. ,roint Gov6rnmeni and indusirialdeveropment proJecte lh c6mputers, mlcro-circuits and machlnetoors w6re corunenced. tait Lncenti.ves *"".-pi""i;.;;";research and devergpffent in epeer.fied knopliag-int"neiveare.E. At the -aeine tirne, assigtance cetsed U6ing glven tosuccessfur capital intensive lndugt,ries rlke 
"i"ir anamotorcars, whlCh were considered to be strong enough tocomPete on their own. Moniee, h&rever, were made availableto certain decLining industries, not, a6 ih the west to propthem up, but to herp them co decri'e. nxamprei ar" intextiles, synrhetlc 
.fibres and shlpbuildfn;;-;tr";" Japaneaeindue.try has become.'rerativery uncompetithTe due to high wagerates and the rlee in the varue of tire yen. corop".. thr.s towidesc-ale Europern efforts to prop up and protect industriesthat for rhe deveroped wortd aie lt.irry i;-d;;iin..
37. There ie one furthe_r and Lmportant reason why Japan isturning increaslngty to knortedgl-based Lndustries. This ie thecombina€ion of tne -harp drop ii the birthrate together with anever increasing eupply of, univereity_eauc;a;-y;"g people.Although .rapan's-unemltoynent flgures are eurrentry better thanmoet of the developed countries in ttre world, she is witneaeing anew t!T)e of unemproyed, the universlty graauate. At the eame tr.methe eociar strucluri- is clgnging-tn a's ;ilh;;-;actory workersare increasingly seeking higfrer-*nge".
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VI. INDT'STRIAE POLICY AND MARKETING STRATEGY
Technoloqrr
38. Japan has built up its expertise in technorogicat products
rargery on the basis of imported know-hox, contract.a tirrough -lldence agreements. rn the paet she has spent rerativery i"""on raaearch and developlrent compared to th- weet, e.g. in 1SZZL.7% of crosa National product agolnst 2.2% in the uia, 2.tin Germany, 2.(fr Ln the UX and 1.8/o in France. poreign
technology ia, howevetr, becoming reedily available to theilapenese and thig ia.partly the reason why \raprn herserf ie
norf maklng rarge strLdee in orn technologicar*developnent.
Another just as lmportant reagon is the .nergence of newlnduetrles -using high teehnologry. Exampres ire office
machinery, ccmmunication equipnent, induetrirl robote,
nunerically controlled machine toolg, vehicle erectronics
and cmrputers. 
- 
All theee products require the use of advancedmLcro-electronic technology. The covdrnment hae set majorrestructurlng goars for industry in the fields or energiconservatLon, higher added vElue productlon and researiir anadevelopment in high technology arees. .
I'tarketinq Strateqv
39. rf Japen hae shown a co-ordLnatod and effective approachto her induetrLal strctegy this has been complemented,by aclearly thought out and determlned marketing etreteglr. oneaees in \rapanese tradlng a eongtant int€r-llnking #il";---dorpstic and internatlonal markets. Japan hag shorn greatdetermination in ensuring rapld grorth on her qrn 
€conomy aswell as externa-l trede. rndeed rapid internal grouth hlsenabred rorper cogts to be attained. ueing her hons salesas a bese for_profltability, ilal)tn has succeeded ln penetrating
rnarkets ebroad by the merhod of rnargLnat coeting rhrli--i;----"=turn has brought about hlgher volume etilr, increaeedproductivity end consequent savings ln cosi.
-40. The JrpeneBe have rearioed the important rerationahipbetween coat and vorume, whereby costs farl significanti|with each lncrease in productton. Eor ine,ta."., t"r"ris,ionset manuftcture costa will fall by approxl_mately 15% and
automobJ Le costs by approximetery Ld every tine productionLn these products dsr:bles.
rn consequence of thr.g each Japanese eompgny tendg toprod.ce a smalr n,mbef of nrodetr,e, ilbeit witfi many f,eatures,to ensure high volunre production. This ig particirlariy----'evldent during the earrier: stages of merket deveropment.
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41, rhe awarenelrs of I cost,/volume relationship hae made theJapanese acutely aware of the neeessiLy to esuautist and quicklyincreese their narket shares in each c-ountry where they d6cide 'to selI. one rherefore finds frequently that artificiiliy-i;prices are being guoted. short tcrm protits are aelirerateiyaacrificed for quick growrh in order lo undermine thetr
comgxt,itors' poeition. Thls etrategy in developed countriesis remarkably effective since more often than not tne marketis dominated by rocar manufacturere who have comperativelylarge market ehareg and who do not etand to galn the samecost/volune adventages 
_by givlng fuIl measrrrJ in cutting theirpricec to the leve1e of the .lapineee.
This aggresEive strategy ie faciritrted for tfapanese
eompanlee by the fact that the @nership of moet oi the larger
comSnnies ie ln comparatively few handg and iE is not expectedthat compenies wiLl return quick proflts frorn new olnratione
and new narkets.
42- A further espect of ,Japanege marketing strategy is thet newproducts are usuglry put on to the home rnarket ueiore beinglaunched abrosd. This ensures that Ehe "bugs,, are got rid ofand that by t-he Eime the produet reaches thi export market,although often adapted for overseaa customers, it t" p"op.rtyteeted end proven Ln use.
The Japeneee, ln their oversera marketlng strategy,have tended to attach firet'those narkets whire compelttionis least fLerce. Consequently, their proaucts have often
appeared flrEt in the more advanced deiel0ping countries,prrticularly in Asia.
43. They lrave alsor oVGr the years, entered at ilrc relativoly10w end of the market, wher:her iE bc economy crra or motor(:yc1e3,caLculatora or radios and televlaions, this has been t,he initialatteck. Many western countries were foored into berlevlngthat Jatrxnese com[raniee wourd be eatisfled wit,h estabrishiigposltlone for themserves at the cheap end of the market. rieydid not eufflciently study what was Laking place in thedevelopment laboratorles of these companiisl or inaeed whatwere the newest products being launched on to the Jlpanesehone market. The reeurt has Eeen t,hat in alrnoet arr sectorswhere th- Japlnese have eEtablished positions at the lorverend of thc market, they have finishedr by estabrishing equarrydangerous leada at the top.
To be able to do thle effeetively and still to set thepace once the product ig exported, means a eonstant and highlyefficient feedback of cugtomer needs, and compeiiio" deveropmentsfrom those markete to be penetrated. rt 
"t"L requirea theclosest liaison between r-search, product develofrment, manufactureand the market to ensure underetanilng or orr. 
"rritner'g necds.
-29 PE 68. at+ /fin.
44. By forgoing h_igh levele of profitabirity in the earry stagesof development, ilapan hae increiEed her *"r*"t-'"iare in hightechnorogy products. Her success in ror-rcnri;; ;; unusuarryefficient enecrarilation srlategv has enabl.J'n"i Lo maintaineconomr.c arowth race' that have-been coneiderably hlgher thanthe average anongst induEtrisrised countries-ii-l.."rrt years.
As a member of o!cD, .rap.n's ghare of tot-a, exports of manu-factures from a11 oEcD countrlee has risen ar"-i"ti"arry since1963, as the accompenyln! table showe. fn.-"i.IJ of exportsof the moet technologically advanced product", -[fro". consideredfundamental for the controi or the iniernationai-'divlslon oflabour, roEe to the point where dlrp.n already held In L977about a quarter of tle markets supplied by oECD countriegdespite its rerdtivuly Emarl etraie of total world trede.
USA
JePrn
EC
-FRG
-France
-Ita ly
-United Kingdorn
-Netherlands
-BLEU
-Denm!rk
2L.2
7.3
58.1
19.4
8.s
5.8
L3.7
4.I
5.4
r.t
L4.9
14.5
55.4
19.4
9.1
7.1
8.6
4.4
5.4
1.0
2L.6
6.0
4.2
12.3
6.7
3.0
0.9
20.2
7.s
4.8
7.3
s.l
3.4
0.8
B. Products Basic *_oglqo_bgicrf @."s1",
Lg_6_3_ p_7J
27. J tb.I
. 8.2 23.?
3s.3 30. s
(1) e.g. Conputors, telecorununications, machlne tools _
source: Tabres rr.r-7 and rrr-r4 0f ,,changes in rndu'trielStructurs l" alrg European Economles atnce theoil CrlEis,, 
-_-fSZS SI;"Iaf rgsue-"f ii.,"op."r,Econorny",_publlehad by the com,,te'ior,-Jr tn"Europea n Conrmunl.tLee 
.
45' The EEC and the united statee cqnbined total 500m lrcoprecompared to 1lOm. geople in .Tepan. Both Western narkets arefar more inherentrv itt"..ti;;-;" tle emeigiii"r,igr, rechnorosyproducts of 
'Japan Lhan are the rar Eastern markete outsideof Japan itself. 
.colsee-uentiy,-iar trom seeing any diminurionof ,rapanese exports to ihe w"il"in world, tfre ieveree is likelyto be the erEe' one must u. ."i.r"r_in giving cl0ae attentionto the aectora of, automobilea,-"it"lfi"fria 
"-fJ"tionic componentseteel etc., that the n., ,ar.-oi-.lrp"rr"se products rrhich is
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sti'll to come is not forgotten. To make sure that lre are notcaught unawlrea agaln we s',.ou1d rook at p""t-"iplrience.
45. ilapan arrnost arways has introduced its new products ontoite oun home markets ind then frequentry in other countriesof the Far East before launehing frrem into the EEC or the usA.
Europe and the US with some exceptions were inadeguatelypretrnred Lo resist the Japanese invalion of consumer electronics,cameras and watehee. We have not had, and do not have, anysystematic strategy. fn high technology sectors such ascomputers, micro-electronics, space eaielliteg, llttleco-ordination has exlsted until nor deeplte the etrorts of thecomission to brr.ng it a-bout particurariy rn-iegira tostandardisation, lnter-face, luurrc pr*,rr-r"ni-a"a researchand development.
In consequence of thls, unlike the ,Japaneee, the Conununitydoeg not have establiEhed prlorities.
47. Since 1960 average productivlty in @rnnny, France and theUK comblned hes been only 5@/" of thet of J"pri. consequentlyto compete agatnst Japan will be that much irarder than it was20 years ago.
VII.
48. whatever meesures ere teken to regulate birateral tradebetween the Communlty_End Japan, that country,s cornpetitivepoaitlon on rhird world nprkete-wtr1 rernii;-; ;*r"rfur faerorover whieh the Corununity has 1ittle control
49. Machlnery represents betsreen a guarter and a third ofexports to devel0ping countriesi eaies of machinery are greaterthan thoee of eractrical egulprnent lnd transport goods takentogether.
rn the evolution of exports of mqchi.nery to the third worrdbetween 1971 and 1928, th€ US dominated foliowed by the FRG andilapan. The uK, France and rtaty performed similarly but theirexports have fallen behind si^nce 1925.
50' Betweerr 1g73 and 1g7g .lapanese exporte of machinery Lo newlyindugtriarised countries strurea-conei-derabr" inciuas.. This waseepecially so in the Mlddle Sast where tur-i*poils tripled between1975 and 1978.
5l' 
'Japanese exportE to Aeia of machlnery and erectrlcar goodsexceeded u bilrion dorrare in rgi'. rr,"!, .xc"JiIa tno". orthe US and four {ajor Suropean-oorntri""'""rOin"a- Japanesedominence is evrdent on aii a"r"" markets except that of theIndien eub-continent.
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52. As the I9g0 OECD Report on \rapen points out the pattern ofJapenese 
€xporta changed consideraUfy in tfr" 
"..orrd half of the1970's with rhe share-of hecvy-inauslrr;"-;;";-;g iron end eteelpetrochemicals, and ehipyarde faUing, ,tii.-itla or machineryexpanded rapidly. rn 1078-rg7g the iitt.r-"ro,ri..o to more than30 per cent of totat gales ebroad, wittr autoiJiif"" accounting fof,about l6 per cent and erectric maetrinery-;;;;;.pmenr around14 per cent. These deveroprneitt.re*eciea tne=rapitt adjustmentof ,rrprnese rnduetry to chinges in ah;-;;;";;r. of wortd demand andtwlrde more technology_inteieive products.
The regional ctructure of exports hag also undergone sigrniflcantchangee wtth deriverlea to opEC countriee, ,iaJr"-income devlroplngcountries and rhe Slno_Sovl.et area (notaUiy Cii*f r sccouDtins io,for a distlnctty higher ehare oi tot"r ;;6J;-..'an before.
53. Many devel0ping countries ere-eeeking to improrre theirorn productive capacity and rhis ,rii-i;i,rii..'"tn.ir demandfor goods from abroad. the n"riy rnaustiiari""o'countriea inpertlcular, are no l0nger lusaive markets to be expl0ited by theinduetrietised eountriig. rn aeeking to cater for theirrequirenents sf eophisticated goorre, the Japlnese with theircompetltive edge wilr contrnue-to be a fcci;;--t;'ue rectonea
54- Action rv tlg conrnunity to limit ,rap.lsss exports by formallyintroducins rarifrs or sulnlitetir" .";a;;i;i; ;;, the EEC as awhole eould onlv execerfer...o*p"ttti"; ;;;;;.1" in third markers.only an enorrnoua eJfort to impr'ove-effieie""v *ittin Europeanindustry, perhepe by the wldeipread use or autometion w111 enablethe comnunlty to relain vttal ir"r"""" nerkets where Europeaninduatrres must conpete with ther.,,lip"i."r-Jiuil.rparts directlv.rt ls for thls reason, if no oifr..r-!t"t gr."i-.iplrasig should basiven to the reference in rhe c"""iri- 
";ffi;i;;"'.o th" need for"further progresa ..-. in getting Europern ind'uetries to deveLooposLtive strategleg to deai wtttr'uaparri"" 
"orp"ti;i;;,'ifffii;;not only restructurlns rn Euaope uut ario iv"il"ia"r invorvenrentln the ilaprneEe narket. r -
VIIfr
55- A key method for expandrng errannels of econsmic co_operati.nbetween JaPtn end the comrnunltf wtlr uc i.r."ti.rt ln eech othera,countrlee. Thig mu6t, trorever, be recipi""ir."''it is clear atpresent thst Japan ls-ripldl.'| *nereasrng rt"-investrent in thecorununiry, both in fully oun.a industrlir 
"ia-r"iretingeubsldlaries, and tn joint ,r.rrtore" with European countriee.There is, h*rever, no Eimilsr trend in inveeiil".i fn J.panfrom European conpaSiee_. 
- 
.f"prrr.". Lnvegtment Ln thecofiutuntty ia more then 10 tiieE that of ttre cormrunity ln Japan.Thls 
'nust be considered eeri"arv cnd solutions found to theproblem.
' By and large there is encouragement for lrepanese co:ntrrenieeto invest in the cormnunlty 
"no-aet.ropnrcnt ;.;;i; are eguarryavailabre to then aa to rocal manufaciur"""-ir,--"Ittirrg up orexpendlng plants. The degre" or encouragenent differs fron onecountry to enother. 
-For examtrrle, tf,. n iufii; ;; Irel.nd arebending over backuards to .n"irr""g" 
.rapanese invegtore. Theyeven have an offlce in Tokyo gor fnis-i.ip";.;"'-
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Ily comparisoa-comnrunity conrparrics, Irrd I lrcnrservcs raqcdin -tapan wLth complicaLed bankini, Lake..ovrr a'g invesLmerrLrules which creale signif icanc barriers. .f,tr..,re f,as t' lle onJalnn's part a mueh greater effort activery io-on"our"ge foreioninveetors and this must incrude a signirici.i-"i*prificationof procedur€s.
56' tt is Erso neccssary for thc ('onrnrrrrrity to agrce morecohesively Uran at present on grourrd rules foi JJp"n"""investment' in Europe- Trrvestmenu should 
.""i.i.,ii continueLo be encouraged, buL onry on certarn conditions.
IX.
57' Arthough we aeknowredge the real difficu1ties to be faced in im1:r.-
vlng the trading situation with Japan, r^re are disappointed t,hat theComnission's Communication to the Couneil of 15 JuIy I9gO, ,,The ltade
PoLicy of the communrty and .rapan : a re-examinatj.on,, (co&t(go ) 444 finar)does'not put forward sufflcient eonstructive and praetical recommenda-
tions for dealing with the pr:oblem.
58' l'he basic approaeh of the communication is tllat ccrtain cou'trrcs
of the EEC, rather than the Community itself, have a ,patchwork,of
discrirninatory national protectionist measures. These measures, which
cauae growing resentment in .rapan, are described by the commissLon as
"more a relic of the 1g50s than a conununity poticy of the 1gg0s,,.
The conuntlsion goes on to anaryse the damage that this does by
weakening the internatLonal eornpetltiveness of cornmnity inrJustry. Ttre
communieation arso points out that ae far a6 ,rapan is concerned therels therefore a gap in the corunon comnercial policy; by not acting together,
the !{ember states are weakened in their dealings with ,rapan, and this
eection of the corsnunication concrudes ,,one firndamentar point neecrs
constantry to be remembered. Any maJor derogation from a eomlon (i.e.
commrnity-wide) poltcy on imports stancrs in tho way of achieving a
single nrarket whieh is the conumrnity,s fi.rst raison d,€tre,,.
59 
' 
Ihe conmission recalls its responsibilities under Article 115 ofthe Treaty as welr aE its responslbilities and duties in respect ot-the renewar of existing cormrerclal agreements by Member states with
ilapan, the possiSre reference of bilateral arrangensnts to the court
of,rustice and the apprication of the principles of commrnity eompeti-tlon policy.
-33- PE 68.474/fin.
60. The commission proPoses that t-he negotiation of a bilateral agrree-
ment, covering both residual quantitative restrictione and
"conununLtarizatLon" of the exlsting national bilateral safegruard clauses,
which has been suspended for nearry a decade, should be resumed.
ifriee cattg6;feioi quantititiire restrictrdns woutd have to be
consideredc
those that can be removed fairly easily;
those where progressive riberalization may be feasibre on abasis of reeiprocity:
those where wide and important interests are aE stake, andwhere large adjustments (incrudlng greater specialization orrestructurlng ln the EEC) would be reguired.
61. fn order to aehieve this liberalizatjon, it may in some cases be
necessary to seek temporary restraint of Japanese exports while European
industry restructures. but the restraint would only be exercised for a
limited period, and this wourd be accompanied by restructuring measures
of the industry concerned.
Aceompanying this liberali.zation any ne!, bilaterar EEc-Japan
agrreement would eontain an element of industrial cooperation which could
cover sueh matters aa eontacts between European and Japaneee Lndustry,
lnvestment by Europe in 
'rapan and vice-versa, and possible collaboration
ln third eountry projects- pinally, ,'A further opening up of the
irapanese market to eommunlty exports would arso contribute to the
strengthenlng of corunercial and industrial ties,,.
62- Any reservations about the comnunlcation d.o not stem from any
criticism of what is proposed but from the rather negative, defensive
and undynamic tone adopted. of eourse, to a eertain extent this is a
reflection of the difficurties of our competitive position vis_i_vis
irapan, whlch have arready been discussed (see paragraph J.3 above). rt
should, however, have been posslbLe to have put forr,rard a more construc_
tive and aggresJive;raper. Even if t^re are flrmly opposed to ,,protectionism,,
as such, the fact remaing that we have to achieve greater access of
community industry and partieular seetors of it not only to ,rapanese
markets, but also within the context of world trade to ensure that the
conununity becomes increasingry competitive in that area whLeh is as
important as redressing the barance of trade between the EEc and Japan.
The subsequent section of the report wilr put forward some suggestions
concerning a more positive and aggressive approach.
a)
b)
c)
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x. POSSXBLE RESPONSES BY THE EEC
63. On 25 November 1980 the Council considered the Conrnisgion's conmunication
and agreed "on the need for a wide-raqging dialogue between the Conununity
and Japan based on common strategy" " The views of the Council are contained
in Council Prees Release 11580/80 (Presse 174), 25 November 1980.
64. The opinions expreseed in this report and the conclusione given below
do not differ subetantially from the spirit of the Council'a declaration of
25 Novernber 1980, but in some reapects they go further. The Council e:rpreseed
its concern at the trade imbalance and the concentration of ;Iapanese exportg
in particular sectorsi it called in particular for moderation of exSrortg to
the Cormunity, for the y€n to reflect the strength of the ,Iapanese economy,
for an inerease in ,fapanese importe from the Cornrrunity and for induetrlal-
cooperation. The Commiesion will report back to the Council in the light
of the Council's statement before the end of Fepruary 1981'
65. Since the declaration 
.of 25 November 1980, the Councll, by decigion of
17 February 1981, has authortged the ComniEsion to introduce a surveillance
syetem covering ilapanese exports of certaln sensitive producte. We welcome
thia as a positive step to creating a Cornmunity stratcaY towards Jryan
66. Having expreesed reservations about the efficacy of the Commigsion's
re-examl-nation of EEC trade policy with Japan, we conclude by putting fomard
our own suggestions, but these apply to the field of the European Connunity's
relations with ,Iapan in the longer term. They refer particularly to how the
countries of the EEC nright improve their competitiveness in relation to
Japan not only in ordgr to reduce the grovring trade imbalance but also to
ensure their place in the world market.
67. fhe role of national qovernments and industries
whatever rol-e the Conmission can play in bringing about genuine and
effective Comnunity strategy, the primary solutions will have to be found
at the level of national industriee and national governments. In the course
of industrial ::eetructuring, decisions wilL have to be taken at a pollticaL
level as to which induetries or Bectors are to be regarded Bs strategic and
vital and are therefofe to be preserved, if necessary with government
aeslstancei so will the unpalatable decigion (which the ,raPanese have been
prepared to take) as to which industries or aectorg ehould be allowed to
run down and be replaced by new induetry or technology.
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The determlnation of individual industries Eo increase their
Reeearch and Developr€nt int,o new products and production methods; to
rationa.Iise thel-r productlon and to improve their marketing effort is
vital. Cooperation wiEhin industry and between government and industry
both on a national and a Community level is beeoming increasingly impor-
tant as large scale pioduction is shown to reduce costs substantially.
Egua1ly, hovrever the use of smaller, peripheral industries supplying main
unlts of industry will need to be developed.
68i Import quotas and Japanese cooperation
I{e do not favour the impositLon of funport guotas against Japanese
products provided the Japanese are willing
a) to aqaept sp,ecific guantifiable restraj-nts on their exports of
eeneLtive pnoducts to the Comlnity. TtrLs relates partJ-cularly
to automcbiles and electronic components but affects other sectors
as well. In the shorter term these restraints vrlll need to be
considerable so as to allorl EuroPean industry the breathing space
to rationalise and automate where neceasary. The restralnts should
be of a eontinuing nature;
b) to open uP their orrn markets to a greater extent than prevlously.
In partieular the recoroendatl.ong oa Page 40 of, thJ.s report mrst
be funplenented. Restrl.ctions on articles such as confectionery,
tobacco and leather nust be freed.
If the .Tapanese are not prepared to agree to voluntary restrletions
ln indlvldual sectors and on a sp€clfic basis, or if 1t is shown that they
have not abidedl by such agreements, then the Comrnity must be prepared
to lmplernent temporary lnrport restrlctions upon the offending lndustrles.
This Ls why it is so Lmportant that any agreenents made between the Conumrnity
and ,fapan muet be quantifl-ab1e and mrst be taken to industry and prodtrct
level. To be clear, this means that products, quantiLy and duration
must be stated and agreed upon. Agreement should as far as Poqsible be
conunon to all EEC countries, and should be negotiated at industry leve1
wLthLn the framework of an overall Ccmmunity/,fa1nn policy agreement.
69. Investnent i-n the eorurunitv
Japanese companLes should be welcomed to the Cmuunity to set up
plants either on a whoIl.y ovrned or joint shareloldlng basls. [Iorever, it
mrst be Lncutrent upon the .fapanese inveetor to abide by eertain require-
ments. we Euggest these should be:
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i- There must be reciproeity of treatment on the parL of theJapanese.
ii- Those Japanese companies making end products- in. the llommunitymust be wt11in9 to undertake to aource a substantiil fCi'qentage ofcomponents from local conpanies.
iii. Japanese companies setting up operations in the fierd ofhigh technology must be wirring to bring into the cormnunity
researeh and development facilities.
Ihe mesEage to the .IapaneEe investor is .f."r.
an integral part of our industrial eeonomy, but
off-shore assenibly plant,' 
.
7 O. InvestmEnt in .fapan
The Japanese must be prepared to give proper evidence that inveet_
ment in Japan is not being hlndered in any industry aector. rf it is,
the reasons and duration must be clearly stated. ,fust as in
however, recLprocity in investment nurst be a starting polnt
tlons wlth the Japanese.
To enstrre that inveetment does take plaee in ilapan, .we
recomnend the settlng up of a joint EEC,/irapan fnvestment Bureau whoEe
Job wIlr be to facilitate Lnvestrnent appllcations fron either side and to
agree the overall paraneters of investnent policy within which bothgovernnents and industry wilt be cbllged to work.
l!. rfoint fnveetment Overeeas
iroint undertakings between cqnunlty and irapanese companies shorld beencouraged' Elowever, once again, reeiprocity is necessary. rf the
commrnity is helplng Japanese companiee to establish themservee where the
conumrnity hae influenee, then equally the Japanese should include community
companies ln spheres where they 
- the ilapanese 
- have the greater infruenee.
72. Action bv the Cormniesion :
we again endorse the cqnmunity,s new strategy as outrinerr in the
comniesion's communication to the councir. Even if this does not gofar enough, it is indisputable that the countrles of the Ten wilL be ableto dear far more effectr.vely with Japan if they speak with one voice
through the conmlssion than if they continue to deal with Japan throughindivldual guantltative restrlctions, gentremen's agreements and voruntary
restraLnt's' Not to do so is to allow Japan to "pick off,' national in<ltrs-tries one by one. On the O[hcr hanc1, Lhe Commissioll 1111lq1. (:v()lv(...r..olun(rnpolicy ln cooperation wi th specific industry seetor revels, since thelrnplementation of agreements needs to be speclfie and by products. The
negotlation of a new cqnrnercial and Economic Agreement between the EEC andJapan must be the priority undertaking.
as
an
"We wieh to weJ.come you
not Ln the capacity of
trading,
for negotia-
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73' The conmunity can' however, do more than thls. rn the first placeit must enaure that, however well_intentloned, certain fields of
conununity activity, as regulated by the provisions of the EEc Treaty,do not in fact operate against,the comtrunlty,s orrn economic interests.Ife refer here particularly to Competltion eoticyl.
rt nay welr be that the comnission shourd re_examine the way in whichthts poiiat nae Ev6-rved and beG-apprled'ih- 6iaer to en.sufe li) thatthe restrictive clauaes (Articles g5 to 90) have not been too harshly
applied tfith the result that industry withln the EEc is being penalised
at the cxpenae of induetry from thlrd countrles (includlng 
.rapan) and(b) that the sectl.ns relating to atds granted by states (Articres g2
Lo 94) are interpreted as liberally ae posslble.
74. The ComnisFion should, as soon as ;rossible, take steps to ensurethat the exrstlng reg,u'lations and direetlves relatlng to trpe approVar
and minlmum standarde2 shourd be made compulsory rather than loptional,.
under the present syst€m, there is nothing to prevent indivlduar l,[ember stateseither manufacturing or importing various items even if they falI belowthe community norm, alr that is usually impried is that no Irlember state
can refuse to lmport, from other Menber States, items which comply withComnunity minlmum standards. We believe that these
minimum standards shourd become compulsory and that no Member state
should be able to import,, from any souree, articles which do not compry
with type approval requirements.
75. rf and when it can be establlshed that particular countries are
uslng unfair practices to proteet their own industries, the gqnnission
should be able to introduce, at Concounity J.evel, reciprocal
measures agalnst that country's exports. Thls suggestion is easier to
make than to put into praetr.ce, and it would invorve the comnissionbeing provided with an adequate budget to maintain a service which couldinvestigate allegations of ,eoneealed protectionism, (c.f. the Commission,steam for dealing with durnping allegations). Any such measures andthelr Justlfleatlon would naturally have to farr withln the frameworkOf thE GATT.
76. trhe co*nission should be provr.ded with adequate funds to forl0w upand intensify the programme it has already inltiated in instructing
businessmen and industrialists on means of penetrating the ilatrnnese
market- Japan's freguent statements encouraging importers ask for a
See Artl_cles
Particularly
to 94 of the Treaty
respect of motor vehicles
85
l-n
1
2
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greater measure of practical cooperation fron them in thls fleld and
consLderation coulcl be glven to this in any new Commerclal and Econcrnie
Cooporation Agreement.
77. Conslderation may have to be given to a Community mechanien of temporary
tariffs to offset Ehe effects of violent currency fluctuatlons of the yen.
We are not, however, very hopeful of the effectivenesS of this approach
since eurrency aberratlons tend to be shortllved phenomena which can
fluctuate very widely (e.9. the riee of the yen in iluly I98O following
ilapanrs movement into an overall balance of trnlments surplus for the firet
time since septenber 1978). certahly, the ilapanese energetical-ly
resist any suggestion that the value of the yen is beLng manipulated for
trade reasons. The Japanese Government should be encouraged, however, i.
to pursue a policy of 'hternationallzation of the yen', not to hinder
its ulrard movement, and not to reduce lts deflcLt too guickLy (lnter-
national burden-sharing). The ultimate goal should be Ehe llnking or
alLgnment of the yen wlth the European llonetary System.
Xf . SITMMARY OF CONCT,USIONS
78. gs stress again that the exlstence of the present trade imbalance
conetLtutes a serious Impedlnent to developlng a fruitful and positive
partnershLp between the ComnrunLty and Japan which will lnvolve eooperation
in matters as diverse as assLstance to developlng countries, world
security, monetary stability and energy conservatLon.
1rne adopt-fon'-of the recomt-endatione contained in the report wiIl,
It is hoped, go a long way to reduclng the trade fuibalanee to an accep-
table level and by doing eo lead to the developmsnt of a partnership
which wlll be benefLclal not oity for the partners but also at a nuch
wider level.
.79. llne Conrnittee on E[(ternal Eeonomic Relationg' main recomtendations
are aE follows:-
a) lsgies-Er-lEe-geyeresesge-eE-UesEeE-g!e!ee-tE9-EsEePe3!-1s9gslgx
I) National governments should coordl.nate their trade and comnercial
polLcles tor{ards ilapan as closely as possLble so that they can speak
to \rapan with one voice.
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2\ rndividual European industries'shorrld nake every effort to
ratlonallse protluctlon and to increase Reseatch btd Devalopmbnt
into new products. Not only ahbuid there be incraaled cooperation
' b€tryeen gov€rnment and industry at both national anri Comuntty
leveI, but also use of smarler induetries supprylnE naln unlte
' of induetry will have to be developed.
3)- Both government and induetry niust aecept the nied for foivard
planning and achieve a gr€ater degree of adbptabrriti (see para-
graph 57).
b) Act,ion
.!y_!!9_g9g!Sl1_!pd conrnies lon of ,t!e _Egtgpg:l_g9gg91lltgt
1. Any ddseussione with Japan muat enable the Menber States to slreak
with one voice and mugt lead to genuine reciprocity in reslrect of any
eoncessione which the comnunity may grant to ilapan. such discuggions
must lead to the aeceptance by 
'rapan of specific quantlflable regtralntg
in respect of sensitive sectors and the complete reclprocity of banking
and intestment facilities (see paragraph Z0).
2. The cdrmissiort nust continue atltl inteneify its er(isting prograrme
for lngtructlng European buFinesgmdn and induetrialigte on the begt
meens of penetratlng thE JaFdneie rharket in cdopeiation with thb
.rapanese. (see paragraph 76).
3. The council must be prepared to grant the conrmissl_on adeguate
fundg and Etaff for such matters as the investigatibn of coieealed
protectloniem and barriere to trade and the indtltution of a .loLnt
EEC/,Iapan InvestmEnt Bureau (see paragraph 70).
Action Ey-!!e_{eB!g9s
1. fire oapanese covernment must take all neiessary neicuies to
remc,ve existlng non-tariff barriere while at the sEme tldle deiionetra-
tinE a greater willingmess to open its marketa to tmioito.
z. 'ite JapEnebb chould be prepared to accelrt speclflc qiuanttfribic
t€ctf6intb of th€ir eifrortii ln rets;re-ct of Eerisitivli riectoiri (gdb
paragfEph 68l.
3. .rapan should faeilltate aceear to banking uS invcatncnt in ordor
to.achieve reciproclty wlth the faclliti€r it onjoyg tn thc comunity(rcr paragraph 70)
e)
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4. Japan should accept the necessity for working towards nonetary
stabilization by the eventual alignment, oE linking, Of the yen with
the European l,Ionetary System (see paragraph 77) .
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AM$EE
MOTTON FOR A RESOLUTTON (DOCTTMENts r-966r/AA,)
tebled hy sir Frederick l,llBRNERa llr SETTIJINGER, !& eNTONIOzzi, lrr Be&FwB;,
Mr cARDrA, Itlr cousTE, I'1r Robert iIAqKsoN, I{r KLTNKENBOURG, ![r TrE(n,,
It{rs !4ARTIN, Itlr MTLIJER-EERI{AIiIN, Mr SaIJZER, Mr SEAIJ, llltrs \I[EEOBE', &!r WAG@,,
Ur f{AegflTEtr, Mrs WIECZOREK-ZE:UI.,. !r!r van AERSSEN, Mr Ingo FRIEDRICB,
Mr von tl@AU, Sir ,fames SCOTT-HOBKINS and Sir ilohn SIEHARE-CLARK
, with reguest for urgent debate pureusnt to Rul€ I.4 of tho Ruleq of proccdwc
oa current EEC-ilapan economic and trede relationg
Thc Europsan Parllsmsnt,
:
- 
havlng regard to the 4th naettng of detregattcina frou the BuroD€Btl
Parllansnt and the iratErssc Dtet uhlelr took plao€ in lo\n frou
16 
- 1S February 1981 and to the evid€[t deelae of the Ja[lan€ae
Dret to decpon and roake fulrer use of theee latargeruauhtorv
relatlona,
- 
gravely conoerned at th€ grouing size of tlro tredc alefidtt bett€en
thc Corulunlty and Jattan ehich Ia nou nrnning at ea emuAl rate d abcut
LI blllion dollaro,
I. Raeolvagr
- to lnforn tho councll end tho CoMis€lotr gf ttE oupprt for the
n€agur€a announcod and tha vl,eue erqrregesd th tlrA COuneitr,r8
atat6n6nt of. L7 pebrua.ry..L9gl ca &Iapas relattroae,
- to stronEthon lts tt€B vlth th€ Jalralrcae parllanent ard to tateaelfy
ite pr€sent 
€achangca ia tha light of the good underrtanqlnq, qld
aesuJ.t8 so fat !6aoh€d,
- to d€brte, at thG oErliest oppoatunity, the guestion of curf€ltt 1
politicEl, econol,c and trade relation8 b€tng€E the Eufopeen
Coduurnity. qnd iraFaD., and the Eeaauaga tl6cs8Easlr to tiEEgv€ tlu$,
2. InatructB lta presld€nt to forrard this reaoluticn tg th€ eoturcil
atrd th€ c@lsston. j,
JUSEIFICAIIOY BOR BffiA PRCEDUBE
urgent preedure ie Juetlfied inamuch ae @ r? F€bruBry rgBr tbe
councll adoptGd a atat€ment otr ttre grdth of JapaDe66 expoatE'to tb€
EEc, the deregatlon fa@ ur6 European parria$ont f,oE relEgloD8 ulth, tha
irapan€ae Di€t ccmpleted ita work @ rg February rggl and el.ce lt Le
e8sGntial for parllaesat a8 a whole to adopt a stBace oa thlE iesu€ at,
an early date.
q
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